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All musical creation builds on previous works. But using frag-
ments of existing musical works in a new work can often constitute
copyright infringement. Copyright law, in cases like Bridgeport Mu-
sic v. Dimension Films (6th Cir. 2005), has recently increased its
restrictions on musicians who wish to engage in sampling, defined as
the practice of using other creators’ sound recordings to create new
music. The paper describes a model of copyright holders’ and sam-
plers’ incentives to create in light of the need to negotiate licenses
for sample-based works to avoid violating copyright law. Even in the
absence of traditional transaction costs or royalty stacking, a distinct
kind of inefficiency emerges. Green and Scotchmer (1995) have shown
that, in the patent context, bargaining may not divide the profit from
the sample-based derivative work between upstream and downstream
∗Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. J.D. 2005, Ph.D. (eco-
nomics) 2009, University of Michigan. I grateful to Jim Adams, Omri Ben-Shahar, Mark
Clague, John DiNardo, Rebecca Eisenberg, Jessica Litman, Justin McCrary, Kembrew
McLeod, the participants of the University of Michigan Intellectual Property Law and
Economics Seminar, and the participants of the Chicago Intellectual Property Colloquium
(jointly sponsored by Chicago-Kent and Loyola University) for their comments. All errors
are my own.
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creators in a way that provides both groups with sufficient incentives
to create. This paper builds on and extends Green and Scotchmer’s
theory by showing that innovation occurring in sequence presents a
reciprocal problem. Both upstream and downstream creators have in-
centive constraints; pure theory cannot say which incentive constraint
is less likely to be satisfied. This problem is exacerbated in the sample-
licensing context because ex ante agreements are not usually possible.
An optimal system for regulating sequential creation would account
for the incentives of both upstream and downstream creators, to the
benefit of both groups and the public. Congress and the courts have
probably failed to achieve this balance, since the economic analysis of
courts (especially the Sixth Circuit) has focused mainly on upstream
creators’ incentives.
1 Introduction: Musical Appropriation,
Borrowing, and Reference
Sampling is the musical practice of using fragments of existing sound
recordings by other musicians (called “samples”) as part of a new piece
of music.1 Digital technology has made sampling much less costly and
has contributed to sampling’s proliferation as a musical practice, play-
ing a significant role in genres like hip-hop, electronic, and art music.
Sample-based music has enjoyed enormous commercial and critical
success. But copyright law presents obstacles to sampling and other
forms of sequential creation. Copyright law recognizes two types of
copyrights in music, protecting both (1) musical compositions and (2)
sound recordings, which are often recordings of particular renditions
of copyrighted compositions. Both kinds of copyrights can be impli-
cated by a single sample, meaning that sampling often requires two
separate licenses. Obtaining such licenses can be costly–or even im-
1See Mark Katz, Capturing Sound: How Technology Has Changed Mu-
sic138-41 (2004).
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possible, when copyright holders refuse to deal. In this chapter, I
develop an economic model of sequential musical creation to investi-
gate the optimal design of copyright law for handling the creation of
sample-based works.
Many musical practices involve borrowing, appropriating, or tak-
ing from preexisting musical works; sampling is not unique in this re-
gard. The long-common practice of quotation involves taking a short
phrase from a prior composition and working it into a new composi-
tion. Quotation differs from sampling because it does not copy part
of an existing sound recording to make its reference, but it too in-
volves borrowing from prior material. “Covers” are re-recordings of
musical compositions that other musicians have recorded previously.
Cover artists can tailor the composition to their own styles and make
their own arrangements, but only up to a point. Less literal forms of
borrowing occur all the time when musicians allude to previous mu-
sic, adopt another musician’s style, or work in a genre developed by
countless previous musicians. Most importantly, almost all music uses
basic building blocks like notes, scales, chords, compositional forms,
and instruments. Only the rarest of musical works fails to use tech-
niques of appropriation, borrowing, or reference.2 Thus, all musical
innovation involves combination and recombination of many elements,
along with the addition of new elements, to produce a unique creation.
But copyright law contains stark differences in how it treats the var-
ious modes of musical borrowing. As Section 2 describes, the recent
Bridgeport case has staked out a new extreme in the disfavored treat-
ment of sampling under U.S. copyright law.
Economically, musicians’ production functions use existing musical
works as inputs of production.3 Section 3 explores the implications
of assuming that samplers negotiate with licensors for the use of ex-
2See, e.g., Joanna Demers, Steal This Music: How Intellectual Property
Law Affects Musical Creativity 31-70 (2006).
3For a model focused on complete duplication that also recognizes that creative works
are inputs to subsequent creative works, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Pos-
ner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 71-84 (2003).
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isting works, based on the sample-licensing negotiations that occur in
the music industry. The parties’ inability to write contracts before
production that allow both licensors and licensees to cover their costs
results in what the patent literature calls the division-of-profit inef-
ficiency. Circumstances exist in which either samplers’ or samplees’
incentive constraints result in their music not being created. This
illustrates how copyright’s regime for sampling can backfire when it
attempts to maximize copyright holders’ incentives rather than pro-
viding a balance between copyright holders and subsequent users.4
When the sample-based work is not created, the copyright holder in
the existing work receives no licensing revenue, harming the creators
of existing works that the stronger copyright regime was supposed
to help. The final subsection of Section 3 extends the model to the
multiple-licensor setting, to capture the situation in which sample-
based songs are collages of many complementary samples.
Copyright law’s regime governing musicians’ use of existing music
plays a large role in what existing music can enter the production pro-
cess, when licenses become necessary, and how much licenses (and the
licensing process) cost. The particular institutions and relationships
involved in licensing negotiations will also play a significant role. By
specifying a formal model of how law, institutions, and incentives in-
teract in the context of sample licensing, this paper aims to provide
systematic understanding of the economic forces at work. Ideally, such
modeling could someday result in a model with both testable predic-
tions and measurable variables—a tall order in the copyright context.
In the meantime, studying the incentives involved in sample licensing
might allow for a better design for copyright’s handling of sequential
musical creation.
4Cf. Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 77–86 (2001) (describing the shift in
copyright’s overarching rationale from a bargain between creators and the public to an
attempt to maximize creators’ incentives).
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2 Copyright’s Regime for Sequential
Musical Creation
This section provides some background in music copyright. It also
explains the statutory provisions and judicial opinions that govern
musical appropriation, borrowing, and reference in general, and sam-
pling in particular.
2.1 Copyright Basics
As mentioned above, two kinds of copyrights potentially apply to any
song or other piece of music: a sound recording copyright5 and a mu-
sical composition copyright.6 In popular songs, and most classical and
jazz pieces, the sound recording is a particular recorded rendition of an
underlying musical composition, which includes the melody, chords,
rhythm, structure, and lyrics. The two copyright holders in a song
may be identical but often they are distinct. For example, Bob Dy-
lan often records his own compositions, but the Byrds also recorded
versions of many of his compositions.
Recording artists often transfer their sound recording copyrights
to record labels in return for financing and marketing their works,
as well as advance and royalty payments. Composers and songwriters
generally sign contracts with publishers to administer their copyrights,
splitting the revenue. In addition, many composers belong to one of
the performing rights organizations, ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC. These
organizations administer blanket licenses for radio stations, concert
venues, and others to perform their members’ songs publicly.7 In
5Sound recordings are defined as “a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds [except
for movie soundtracks] . . . regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in which they
are embodied.” 17 U.S.C. §101 (2000). They were not protected under federal law until
1971. Sound Recordings Act, Pub. L. No. 140, 85 Stat. 39 (1971).
6The copyright code uses the term “musical work,” but does not define it except to say
that lyrics are included. 17 U.S.C. §102(a)(2) (2000).
7For a primer on the music industry, see generally Donald S. Passman, All You
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the models below, I will treat the sound recording copyright holders
and the musical composition copyright holders in existing works as
single entities. In reality such agents are more complex, but I assume
that their profit-maximizing incentives are aligned sufficiently for the
analysis to be meaningful.
Musical compositions come with five exclusive rights: reproduc-
tion, distribution, preparation of derivative works (such as adaptations
and translations), performance, and display. Sound recordings come
with the same first three rights, a performance right limited to certain
online performances (i.e., leaving out performances on traditional AM
and FM radio), and no display right.8
Using a sample often involves infringing exclusive rights in both
a copyrighted composition and a copyrighted sound recording. This
is because taking a fragment of a sound recording necessarily means
using the part of the composition underlying that fragment. For in-
stance, using a sample of Marvin Gaye and Tammi Terrell singing
“Ain’t no mountain high enough / Ain’t no valley low enough” means
not only using a recording of Gaye’s and Terrell’s voices singing those
lines, but also using the melody, harmony, and rhythm that make up
the lines in the composition. A single action can infringe multiple
rights at once; sampling often does so. Using a sample can constitute
a reproduction. It can also constitute a derivative work, because tak-
ing a fragment of an existing work and placing it into a sound collage
is a form of adaptation. Additionally, sampling can also implicate the
copyright holders’ distribution and performance rights if the sample-
based song is marketed to the public, played live, or played on radio
or television).
The foregoing discussion uses conditional language (“can infringe”;
“might infringe”) to address whether a sample actually infringes a
composition, sound recording, or both. The conditional verb tense is
necessary for three sets of reasons. First, not all compositions and
Need to Know About the Music Business (2000).
817 U.S.C. §106 (2000).
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recordings are subject to copyright protection. For example, some
sound recordings pre-date federal or state copyright protection. Other
copyrights may have existed at one time, but later expired because of
copyright’s limited duration or because the copyright was not renewed
at a time the law still required renewal.9 Moreover, copyright owners
can voluntarily put works into the public domain, meaning that the
public can use them freely.
Second, a sample might not infringe because even currently valid
copyrights are subject to limitations and exceptions. For instance,
courts have recognized a “de minimis” threshold, meaning that using
very small portion of a copyrighted work will not necessarily consti-
tute infringement.10 Another important limitation on copyright pro-
tection is the fair use doctrine, which gives infringement defendants
an affirmative defense for activities “such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research.”11 Many other lim-
itations to copyright, both broad and narrow, exist in the copyright
code and in case law, but these are the most important provisions for
the model in this chapter.
The third and final reason a sample may not infringe a copy-
right would be a failure on a copyright-infringement plaintiff’s part to
demonstrate that the sample-based song is “substantially similar” to
the plaintiff’s recording or composition. Some infringement cases in-
volve identical copies of an entire work. But many other infringement
cases involve things that come close but are not identical—the idea
being that altering a minuscule detail of a copyrighted work should
not exonerate a brazen copier. Courts do not require a complete,
perfect copy for infringement. Instead, courts adjudicate claims for
9Copyright is also limited in time, expiring 70 years after an author’s death. 17 U.S.C.
§302(a) (2000). Copyrights lasts for 95 years after publication (or 120 years after creation,
whichever comes first) for a “work for hire,” meaning a work either commissioned or
performed by an employee within the scope of employment. Id. §§101, 302.
10See Judge Newman’s discussion in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, 126
F.3d 70. 74-76 (1997) (declining to find the defendant’s use de minimis).
1117 U.S.C. §107 (2000).
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infringement of the reproduction and derivative-works rights based on
the substantial similarity test.12 Because sampling is a unique form of
musical borrowing, one treatise writer has developed a modified con-
cept of substantial similarity called “fragmented literal similarity” to
handle sampling cases in which “the similarity [between two parties’
works], although literal, is not comprehensive—that is, the fundamen-
tal substance, or skeleton or overall scheme . . . has not been copied;
no more than a line, or a paragraph, or a page or chapter of the copy-
righted work has been appropriated.”13 The treatise provides “no easy
rule of thumb” but advises courts to consider the sample both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively with respect to the “plaintiff’s” work.14 The
cases in the next subsection will illustrate how that doctrine applies
in the sampling context.
The dual nature of music copyright—splitting the rights in music
into composition copyrights and sound recording copyrights—means
that the number of necessary licenses is generally at least double the
number of sampled songs. The limited nature of copyright means that
samplers will often, but not always, require a license to use existing
works. In particular, samplers are free to use works that were never
copyrighted and works whose copyrights have expired. Samplers may
also engage in non-infringing uses of copyrighted works without per-
mission or a license, but such uses may be difficult, uncertain, and
costly to identify. In the models of this chapter, non-infringing uses or
works not under copyright have a licensing fee of zero, but they may
come with information costs to verify their status as non-infringing.
2.2 Sampling Case Law
Digital technology and the rise of hip-hop led to an increase in sam-
pling activity among musicians in the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1980s,
12See Julie E. Cohen et al., Copyright in a Global Information Economy
353-94 (2002).
13Nimmer on Copyright §13.03[A][2] (2005).
14Id. (emphasis in original).
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copyright owners began to file lawsuits, many of which settled out of
court. In 1991, Grand Upright Music v. Warner Brothers Records
was the first published judicial opinion to establish that sampling was
copyright infringement.15 Rapper Biz Markie admitted to sampling
the song “Alone Again (Naturally)” by Gilbert O’Sullivan. Judge
Kevin Duffy’s opinion famously opened with the phrase “Thou shalt
not steal,” and found that Biz Markie’s sample infringed O’Sullivan’s
composition copyright.16 Although the opinion lacked a thorough
analysis of copyright law, the case signaled to the music industry that
samples should be cleared to avoid an infringement lawsuit.
More lawsuits ensued.17 Each sampling case is decided based on
the specific facts and context.
Three particularly prominent sampling cases—one about fair use,
two about the de minimis threshold—illustrate the difficulties of dis-
cerning the boundary between infringing and non-infringing samples.
The Supreme Court addressed a sampling-related dispute that be-
gan when rap group 2 Live Crew sampled parts of Roy Orbison’s
“Pretty Woman.” The Court held that a parody—even a commercial
parody for which permission was sought and then denied—could be
a fair use of the composition it mocked.18 The Court also suggested
15780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
16Id. at 182.
17See, e.g., Williams v. Broadus, 99 Civ. 10957 (MBM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12894 (S.D.N.Y. August 27, 2001) (holding that a genuine factual issue existed whether
plaintiff Marley Marl’s song, which sampled Otis Redding’s “Hard to Handle,” was itself an
unauthorized derivative work, which would exonerate defendant Snoop Dogg for sampling
Marley Marl’s song); Fantasy, Inc. v. La Face Records, No. C 96-4384 SC ENE, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9068 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 1997) (dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint for
creating an unauthorized derivative work because the sampled recording, made in 1971,
predated federal protection for sound recordings, which did not occur until 1972); Jarvis v.
A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993) (denying summary judgment for defendant
group C&C Music Factory because it might have infringed by sampling a qualitatively
important keyboard part and short but qualitatively important lyrical phrases from a
song by plaintiff composer Boyd Jarvis).
18Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581-85 (1994).
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that other, non-parodic, “transformative uses” could qualify as fair
use.19 But subsequent case law has not established anything like the
(relatively) safe harbor that parody enjoys.
A unique and interesting case arose after the Beastie Boys sampled
a three-note melodic phrase—C, D-flat, C, played on the flute over
an overblown background C—from Newton’s composition “Choir.”20
The Beastie Boys had licensed the sound recording from Newton’s
record label. But they had not licensed the underlying composition
from Newton himself, who owned the publishing rights. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the Beastie Boys’ use
was de minimis, applying an ordinary observer interpretation of that
exception to infringement.21 The court held that the three notes were
“ ‘a common building block tool.’ that ‘has been used over and over
again by major composers in the 20th century.’ ”22
Two years later, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films held
that no de minimis threshold applied to sound recordings.23 “100
Miles and Runnin’,” a song by N.W.A., sampled two seconds from a
guitar solo of the George Clinton song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam.”
The two-second sample was a recording of three notes from a single
chord played in rapid succession (what musicians call an arpeggio).
“100 Miles and Runnin’ ” was used in the movie I Got the Hook-
Up without a synchronization license for the sound recording.24 The
court read Section 114(b) of the copyright code, which explicitly ex-
cludes “entirely . . . independently created” works from the reach
of the reproduction and derivative-works rights of sound recording
copyrights,25 to imply the converse: that any work not entirely in-
19Id. at 579.
20Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
21Id. at 1193 (“To say that a use is de minimis because no audience would recognize
the appropriation is thus to say that the use is not sufficiently significant.”).
22Id. at 1196 (quoting testimony defendants’ expert Dr. Lawrence Ferrara).
23410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). In other words, the court held that, for sound recordings,
the de minimis threshold is zero.
24The musical composition had received a synchronization license. Id. at 796.
2517 U.S.C. §114(b) (2000).
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dependently created infringes.26 The end result is that in the Sixth
Circuit (Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Michigan) there is no de
minimis threshold for the infringement of copyrighted sound record-
ings. Or, as put it: “Get a license or do not sample.”27 The court
allowed for the possibility of fair use but did not rule on that issue.28
While other circuits may reject this approach in the future, Bridgeport
has effectively become the law of the land for the time being. Since
most recordings are marketed nationwide, infringement plaintiffs will
generally have the opportunity to file in the Sixth Circuit.
The copyright policy of Bridgeport, along with other cases holding
that sampling can be copyright infringement, motivates this chapter’s
analysis. Should copyright holders enjoy a strong property right in
samples—small fragments of larger works? Or would it be more effi-
cient for copyright law treat some samples as too small to infringe?
3 A Model of Sequential Musical Cre-
ation
This section explores the assumption that samplers negotiate with li-
censors for the use of existing works, rather than taking input prices as
given from a market for samples. The prevailing music-industry prac-
tice is to negotiate sample licenses on a case-by-case basis. Although
some copyright owners offer a menu of licensing fees, with licenses
available to all comers at a certain price, most copyright owners en-
gage in individual negotiations with would-be samplers.
3.1 Setting up the model
Suppose that a new piece of music requires using a digital sample
of one existing piece of copyrighted music. Assume that the new




derivative work will have no value without incorporating the sample.29
In addition, assume that the new piece of music definitely infringes
both the composition and sound recording copyrights in the sampled
piece of music. If the sampler failed to obtain licenses from both
copyright holders, then he or she would be found liable and his or her
payoff would be significantly negative. Thus, without licenses the new
work will not be produced.
The original, sampled work would yield value to consumers of v,
which reflects the combined value of its recording and underlying com-
position (experienced as a unified whole by listeners). The composer
and recording artist of the existing work must both make their con-
tributions for the existing work to have value; if either declines to
produce her contribution, the existing work has zero value and is not
created. The new, sample-based work has a value to consumers of q.
The creator of the sample-based song is both composer and recording
artist for that song.
Musicians have fixed costs of production, which include the costs of
capital (e.g. recording equipment) and labor (e.g. session musicians),
and zero variable costs. The fixed costs of production to specific to
each of the three works are: cDW for the new, sample-based work;
cSR for the preexisting sound recording; and cMC for the preexisting
musical composition.
The optimal marginal cost of information once it has been created
is (very close to) zero, but copyright law allows copyright owners to
maintain a price for their goods that is meaningfully greater than
zero. The parameters describing the consequences of this feature of
copyright law are as follows: Copyright holders can collect revenue
equal to a fraction π of their works’ value to consumers. Society
experiences deadweight loss l every period a work is under copyright.
Both π and l are functions of the duration of copyright and the social
discount rate, but making that explicit does not affect the model’s
29The assumption that the derivative work loses all its value without the sample will be
relaxed later in the chapter.
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basic implications.
Thus, the total social value will be positive for each work under
the following conditions [the “positive social value conditions”]:
• For the new, sample-based song: q (1− l)− cDW > 0
• For the existing, sampled song: (v + q) (1− l) − cMC − cSR −
cDW > 0
The goal of the model is to demonstrate that even when these
positive social value conditions hold, one or both songs might not be
created. This is true even with perfect information, risk-neutrality of
all agents, and zero transaction costs (all of which the model assumes).
3.2 Division of profit: The source of ineffi-
ciency
What will drive the model’s results are two key facts together with
insights about bargaining, credible threats, and backward induction.
First, sampling may occur long after the sampled work is created.
The sampler’s identity is not known when the original, sampled work
is created, making an ex ante agreement impossible. If the sampler
stands to make profits but the sampled musicians would fall short
(looking ahead to sales of their work and the Nash-bargaining outcome
of licensing negotiations), there is no way the sampler can promise to
give the sampled musicians a better deal—the sampler doesn’t know
he wants to be a sampler yet, because the original work doesn’t exist
yet.
Second, if the original work exists and the sampler chooses to sam-
ple it, the sampler does not know a license is necessary until after sink-
ing her costs of producing her sample-based song. This stems from the
institutional details of musical production. A musician often does not
know what sample is desired until she spends the studio time to create
a song with that sample. This makes licensing before creation of the
sample-based work very rare. Given that, if the sampler stands to fall
short of making a profit (looking ahead to sales of her work and the
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Nash-bargaining outcome of licensing negotiations), there is no way for
the sampler to make a credible threat not to create the sample-based
song—if licensing negotiations have started, the sampler’s production
costs are already sunk.
The model presented here is an adaptation of a model by Green and
Scotchmer that focused on the patent context, particularly the issue
of patents for basic research.30 In the context of sequential innovation,
where basic research may lead to commercially valuable products, a
danger exists that—without patent protection—basic researchers will
not have sufficient incentives for their research. This can occur even
when that basic research and all the commercially marketable prod-
ucts it would lead to would have net positive social value.
The contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate that the prob-
lem is reciprocal. Not only can the absence of intellectual property
protection endanger the creation of upstream works, the presence of
intellectual property protection can endanger the creation of down-
stream works. When society would benefit from both works, the in-
centives of both copyright owners of sampled works and the musicians
who sample matter.
The game play proceeds as follows:
1. The values of all variables are known and taken as given.
• Consumer demand determines the value of each work, v and
q.
• Music production technology and the idiosyncrasies of each
work determine the cost, cXX , to each musician.
• The parameters π and l are commonly known.
• Only the identity of the sampler is not known to the creators
of the sampled work.
2. The composer of the original work decides whether to create the
30See Jerry Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential In-
novation, 26 RAND J. Econ. 20 (1995), particularly the presentation in Suzanne
Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives135-42 (2004).
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composition.
3. The recording artist of the original work decides whether to make
the recording.
4. If either the composition or the recording is not created, the
original work will not exist and the game ends. If the original
work does exist, the sampling musician decides whether to create
the sample-based work.
5. If the sample-based work exists, then the sampler must obtain
two licenses, one from the composer and one from the recording
artist, or else the sample-based work cannot be released com-
mercially and garner revenue.
Solving the model requires backward induction and thus starts
with the fifth and last step: licensing negotiations. Bargaining among
the sampler and the samplees takes place according to the three-person
licensing game described in Appendix A. As a result of bargaining,




3 , the Nash solution. As Appendix
A shows, the Nash result is approximated as the negotiating parties’
subjective (commonly held) discount factor approaches unity.
At the fourth step, the sampling musician decides whether to pro-
duce her song or not. She will do so whenever the revenue she can








Thus, society will lose out on sample-based works that have positive
social value when:





In other words, when the sampler’s one-third share of the profit from
the derivative work is not great enough to cover the fixed costs of
producing the work, then the derivative work will not be produced.
This is partly a result of the three-way split of the derivative work’s
profits. But at its root, it is a result of the institutional setting;
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samplers typically do not seek out licensors until their sample-based
works have already been created. This makes the case of ex ante
licensing, more relevant in the patent context of Scotchmer and Green,
unusual in this context. Only ex post licensing is realistic in the music
industry, when songs generally have to be created and heard to be
evaluated. If ex ante licensing were possible, then the costs as well as
the revenues of the derivative work could be shared among the original
sound recording copyright holder, the original musical composition
copyright holder, and the sampler.
At the third step, the recording artist of the sampled work decides
whether to record the composition, if it exists. The compulsory li-
cense for cover versions compositions gives the recording artist of the
sampled work leverage to pay the composer a fixed fraction m < 12
of the sampled work’s revenue. The composer does worse than the
two-person Nash-bargaining result of 12 ,
1
2 . As mentioned above, a
recording artist can cover a composition without the composer’s per-
mission if it has been commercially released once. But this compulsory
license for second, third, and nth versions has historically influenced
the licensing fee for the first recording of a composition as well. If
a composer refused to grant the recording artist a license to be the
first to record a composition, the recording artist would merely have
to wait until another artist recorded the song, at which point the
recording artist could immediately take advantage of the compulsory
license. Thus, in music-industry practice, composers typically receive
the current statutory rate as a royalty on sales of recordings.31
Thus, at the third step, the recording artist decides whether the
fraction (1−m) of the revenue vπ from the sampled work is sufficient
to cover her costs cSR. At the second step, the composer decides
whether the fraction m of the revenue vπ from the sampled work is
31See 17 U.S.C. §115(a)(2); see also Passman, supra. The current rate is 9.1 cents per
copy sold or 1.75 cents per minute, whichever is greater. U.S. Copyright Office, Mechanical
License Royalty Rates (May 30, 2006), at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html
(last visited May 17, 2009).
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sufficient to cover her costs cMC .
Steps two and three determine whether any music is produced at
all. If the composer and recording artist of a work cannot cover their
costs through sales of their own song plus licensing fees from the song
that samples theirs, they will not produce. The social value of the
original, sampled work includes the value of the new, sampling work
that depends on it. Society will lose out on two works that collectively
have positive social value when:
(v+q) (1− l)−cMC−cSR−cDW > 0 but
[












The logic of these equations is similar. If one of the original creators
cannot cover its costs—even with the help of receiving one-third of
the revenue from the derivative work—then neither the original nor
the derivative work will be produced.
Two inefficiencies are possible. The creators of either the prior,
sampled work or the later, sampling work could fail to meet their
incentive constraints. It might seem counter-intuitive that inefficiency
could arise from a perfect information, zero-transaction-cost model
with no uncertainty and risk-neutral agents. The driving force of
the inefficiency is that musicians sink their costs before negotiating
licenses, whether for samples of or samples used in their work. Viewed
from another angle, the source of the inefficiency is the timing of the
agents’ actions. The sequence of events means that a single piece of
information is missing when production occurs: the identity of the
licensor or licensee they will need to negotiate with to authorize the
use of a sample.
3.3 Comparing two copyright regimes
The preceding subsection describes the inequality conditions that de-
termine when socially desirable works will not be created. Those con-
ditions resulted in part from the assumption that the sample infringed
17
the original work’s copyright. Making the opposite assumption, that
the sample does not infringe the original work’s copyright, would al-
ter the conditions for inefficiency as follows. Inefficiency would occur
whenever any one of the following pairs of inequalities holds:
q (1− l)− cDW > 0 but qπ < cDW
(v + q) (1− l)− cMC − cSR − cDW > 0 but (1−m) vπ < cSR
(v + q) (1− l)− cMC − cSR − cDW > 0 but mvπ < cMC
Each pair of inequalities has a positive social value conditions and an
incentive constraint; there is one pair for each musician in the model,
as in the previous subsection. The only difference is that the licensing-
fee terms, q3π, have been eliminated.
Switching to a regime in which samples do not receive copyright
protection tilts the likelihood toward the sampling musician being able
to meet her incentive constraint. In particular, society gains sample-
based derivative works—relative to the copyright regime—whenever
qπ
3 < cDW < qπ and the recording artist and composer of the original
work can meet their incentive constraints without licensing fees, i.e.,
(1−m) vπ > cSR and mvπ > cMC . When these conditions hold,
a no-copyright regime produces two works whereas the copyright-in-
samples regime produces only one work, the original song. That is the
marginal benefit of eliminating copyright in samples.
At the same time, moving to a no-copyright regime means it is
less likely that the sampled musicians will meet their incentive con-
straint. Under this regime, society loses original works—relative to the
copyright regime—whenever (1−m) vπ < cSR <
[
(1−m) vπ + qπ3
]




, provided that the sampling artist
can still afford the cost of production while paying licensing fees i.e.,
qπ
3 > cDW . When these conditions hold, a no-copyright regime pro-
duces no works at all, because at least one of the creators of the
original work cannot meet her incentive constraint. Those lost works
are the cost of shifting away from copyright protection for samples.
18
Under these same conditions, the regime with copyright in samples
would foster the production of both works.
Which regime is more efficient, copyright or no copyright in sam-
ples, depends on the distributions of the random variables v, q, cMC ,
cSR, and cDW , as well as the parameters π, l, and m. The specifics
of these distributions and parameters determine whether the value of
the works gained outweighs the value of the works lost; in general,
either regime could be more efficient.
Here is an example where a no-copyright regime is more efficient
than a copyright-in-samples regime. Let U(a, b) denote the uniform
distribution over the interval [a, b] and assume the following:
• v ∼ U(0, 4)
• cMC ∼ U(0, 0.9)
• cSR ∼ U(0, 0.9)
• q ∼ U(0, 4)
• cDW ∼ U(0, 2)
• π = 0.5
• l = 0.25
• m = 0.5
Under these assumptions, the no-copyright regime is superior approx-
imately 13.6 percent of the time, with derivative works of mean value
1.11 being lost. The total gain to having no copyright in samples is
thus 0.151 on average (13.6 percent times 1.11). Also under the above
assumptions, the copyright-in-samples regime is superior 6.59 percent
of the time, with original and derivative works of combined mean value
2.24 being lost. The total loss from having no copyright in samples
is thus 0.148 on average. The gain to switching to the no-copyright
regime exceeds the cost. The no-copyright regime is more efficient
under the above assumptions.
The above is just one example of what might happen in the sequen-
tial innovation context between a sampling musician and the musicians
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she samples. It proves, by counterexample, that copyright protection
for samples can be less efficient than having no copyright protection
for samples. This is true even in the absence of transaction costs, un-
certainty, risk-aversion, imperfect information, externalities, or other
market imperfections. The only barriers to efficiency are the timing of
production and the necessity of sinking one’s production costs before
one can grant or obtain a license to sample.
3.4 Extension: Multiple samples within one
derivative work
A straightforward way to extend the model from the single-sample to
the multiple-sample case is to approximate the result of n-way bar-
gaining with the Nash solution: each party receives 1n of the bargaining
surplus. In the model, the parties are bargaining over the returns to
the sample-based work, qπ. With one sample, each party received qπ3 ,
because there were three parties at the bargaining table: the original
composer, the original recording artist, and the sampling musician.
With two samples, there would be five parties at the bargaining table
(two original composers, two original recording artists, and the sam-




where n is the number of samples






As the number of samples increases, the sampling musician’s revenue
approaches zero. Each licensor’s licensing revenue also approaches zero
(meaning that each licensor’s incentive constraint approaches what it
would be if the sample-based work did not exist).
This simple extension of the model captures a kernel of truth about
the real world of sample licensing. In practice, musicians who use
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multiple samples per song—creating, say, a collage of twenty or more
existing songs—cannot hope to obtain the necessary licenses without
pushing their revenue to zero or less.32
4 Extension: Adjustment to sample
length is possible
The model of the previous section assumes that the entire value q of
the downstream work depends on its sample of the upstream work.
In that context, one can only compare two extremes of copyright law:
copyright protection for samples or no such copyright protection. In
this section, I extend the model such that: (a) only a fraction of the
downstream work’s value depends on the sample and (b) the fraction of
value that does depend on the sample is proportional to the sample’s
length in time. This allows investigation of a third policy option:
copyright protection for samples with limitations and exceptions.
The de minimis threshold for copyright infringement embodies the
idea that some uses of existing music are so small that the law should
not recognize them as violations. It was the subject of the recent
Bridgeport decision, which ruled that no de minimis threshold exists
for sound recordings analogous to that for compositions. The de min-
imis threshold lends itself straightforwardly to quantitative modeling.
Another important limitation on copyright, fair use, involves a larger
set of considerations and would require a richer set of variables to ana-
lyze. But one consideration in fair use analysis is the quantity used of
the original work, meaning that a model of the de minimis threshold
takes one step in the direction of modeling fair use.
Instituting such a threshold allows the law some breathing room,
which could have important benefits in terms of samplers’ incentives
32The possibility of licensing fees that exceed the sales revenue of the sample-based work
could be captured with a model where each sample has its own market with a market-
determined (rather than bargaining-determined) price. In a market-based model, nothing
would constrain the samples from exceeding sales revenue.
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and in terms of avoiding the transaction costs of licensing. The de
minimis threshold will also have the consequence of providing some
samplers with the incentive to shorten their samples, to take advantage
of copyright law’s choice to limit its own reach.
4.1 Revising the model
Suppose that copyright subsists in any fraction [measured in time] of
a musical work y ∈ (0, 1). Each sampler, in the one-sample set up,
will have a desired sample length y∗. The new, sample-based work
has an associated loss function L(y) which measures the proportional
loss in value from adjusting the length of a sample downward from y∗.







with y∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) denoting the desired sample length and λ ∈ (1,Λ) for
some large, finite Λ parameterizing the degree of distaste for moving
away from the most desired sample. Higher λ means more distaste
for deviations from the optimum. As a consequence of this functional
form, L(y) ∈ (0, 1).33 There is an implicit—and admittedly imper-
fect, since it puts the qualitative dimension of sample choice aside—
assumption that shorter samples contribute less to the value of the
derivative work, and thus it is most desirable to decline to compen-
sate the tiniest samples.
Given this loss function, the commercial value of the new, sample-
based work is now q · [1 − L(y)]. Under what circumstances will the
musician reduce the sample and avoid the licensing fees? Whenever
q · [1 − L(y)] ≥ q3 (the musician’s approximate share of the profits
after licensing)—that is, whenever L(y) ≤ 23 . The y that makes this
equation hold with equality will depend on the sampler’s particular
33I assume that the licensor never wishes to grant (and the licensee never wishes to use)
a larger sample than desired. Thus, there is no need for a quadratic, i.e. two-sided, loss
function.
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parameters y∗ and λ, and implicitly depends on the equilibrium of the
three-person bargaining game.
As a result of making the sampler’s decision problem more flexible,
we now have three cases:
1. The sampler need neither license nor adjust he sample, because
y∗ < y. If the sampler’s desired sample length is below the de
minimis threshold of copyright law, the sampler will earn qπ −
cDW whenever that expression is positive. The only danger of
social loss is whether qπ3 was needed to incentivize the preexisting
sound recording or musical composition.
2. The sampler can alter the sample, even though y∗ ≥ y, to make
the chosen y < y. In this case, all we need for the sample-based
work to be created is:
q · [1− L(y)]π ≥ cDW





[To see this, set L(y) = 23 .] Again, the harm to social welfare
involves any original, sampled works for which qπ3 was needed to
incentivize the preexisting sound recording or musical composi-
tion.
3. The sampler would rather license than alter the sample because
y∗ > y and L(y) > 23 . Then the original inequalities hold from
the simplest case above (the case without adjustment of sam-
ples).
4.2 Three different copyright regimes
Determining the optimal level of y requires an analysis of what works
are gained or lost to society under different scenarios, corresponding
to different levels of y. In each of the three scenarios, there are up
to to three cases to analyze, corresponding to different ranges of the
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sampler’s value of y∗ in relation to y. Throughout the discussion, I
mean to refer to works with positive social value.34
No copyright over derivative works. This corresponds to y = 1.
Under that condition, any value of y∗ puts us into case (1) above.
No sample of any length necessitates obtaining a license. Socially
valuable derivative works are not created whenever qπ < cDW .
Nor are they created if either (1−m) vπ < cSR or mvπ < cMC ,
since the creators of the original, sampled song cannot make a
positive profit.
Complete copyright over derivative works. Next consider the con-
sequence of y = 0. Here, only case (3) is relevant, because there
is no de minimis threshold and thus there is no reason in this
simple setup for the sampler to alter the sample length. Society
gains creative works with respect to the no-copyright scenario
when both original artists cross the profitability threshold:














Society loses socially valuable sample-based works because of




π < cDW < qπ
Therefore, there are benefits and costs from moving between a
regime of no copyright at all to a regime of complete copyright.
Copyright over derivative works with a de minimis threshold.
Now suppose that y is strictly greater than zero, but is still less
than one. The particular costs and benefits of moving to this
intermediate level of copyright protection determine the optimal
level of y.
34See the end of the preamble to Section 3 for the three positive social value conditions.
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Case (1): y∗ ≤ y. Among sample-based works with y∗ below




< cDW < qπ; mvπ > cMC ; and (1−m) vπ > cSR
We lose both the original, preexisting work and the sample-based




meaning that the sample-based work would have been profitable,
had the original works come into being;
mvπ < cMC or (1−m) vπ < cSR
meaning that without licensing revenue, at least one of the copy-








meaning that with the licensing revenue, the copyright owners
of the original song would have made a profit, and thus seen fit
to produce the original work.







y. In this adjusted-sample case,
we first need to revise the positive social value conditions slightly,
to reflect the derivative work’s decline in value:
• Derivative work: [1− L(y)]q (1− l)− cDW > 0
• Original recording: {(1−m) v+q(1−L(y)]} (1− l)−cSR−
cDW > 0
• Original composition: {mv + q[1 − L(y)]} (1− l) − cMC −
cDW > 0
Assuming that those conditions hold, we can now discuss the
socially valuable works that would be gained or lost as compared
to the complete-copyright scenario. Among sample-based works
with y∗ lying between the de minimis threshold and the largest
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sample length y that is worth incurring the loss L(y) to adjust,
we gain sample-based works for which:
qπ
3
< cDW < [1− L(y)] · qπ
which specifies that the derivative work, which was not prof-
itable if the full sample was licensed, would be profitable with
an adjusted sample. For this gain in the number of sample-based
works created to occur, it also must be true that both
mvπ > cMC and (1−m) vπ > cSR
which guarantees that the original, sampled song will still be
created, even without the licensing revenue.
As in Case (1), we lose both the original, preexisting work and




meaning that the sample-based work would have been profitable,
had the original works come into being;
mvπT < cMC or (1−m) vπ < cSR
meaning that without licensing revenue, at least one of the copy-









meaning that with the licensing revenue, the copyright owners
of the original song would have made a profit, and thus seen fit
to produce the original work. These conditions for losing the
original work are the same as in case (1) because, regardless of
the sampler’s particular y∗, the requirement for a work to be lost
is that it was being made before and that it will no longer be
licensed thanks to the de minimis exception and the ability to
adjust sample length downward.
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In addition, society could lose some value from samples being
adjusted in derivative works that were already being made under
the complete-copyright scenario. For this to occur, cDW would
have to be less than qπ3 , so that the work was getting made in
the complete-copyright scenario. But if it’s also the case that
[1 − L(y)] · qπ > qπ3 < cDW , then the sampler will adjust the
sample to make more profit. In that event, society gets only the
fraction [1 − L(y] times the original social value of the sample-
based work. That loss in social value must also count in the
ledger when assessing the gain and loss from introducing a de








y. In this event, no works are gained
or lost, nor is any social value lost, with respect to the complete-
copyright scenario. No sampler with a y∗ this high will find it
profitable to adjust their sample; he or she will either license the
sample or choose not to produce the sample-based work at all.
4.3 The optimal threshold for copyright pro-
tection
As in the previous section, the optimal policy will depend on the
distributions of the random variables and the values of the parameters.
Some general conclusions might be drawn about which regime the cost-
benefit calculation would be likely to recommend. In contrast to Green
and Scotchmer’s concerns in the patent context about whether basic
research will occur, the copyright context suggests that policy makers
should have concerns about balancing the incentives of both upstream
and downstream creators (rather than having a primary concern on
just the upstream creators).
In the music context, ex ante licensing does occur, as when copy-
right holders hire other musicians to remix their songs. But many
samplers do not know in advance which samples, sounds, and combi-
nations of sounds will occur to them and sound good together. With
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ex post licensing, the creator of the derivative work typically has no
opportunity to share their costs with the copyright owners of the orig-
inal work. This is especially true in light of the distance in time that
can often occur between samplee and sampler, described in Section
3.2. This makes possible a number of situations in which samplers’
incentive problem results in derivative works not being created. In
those instances, copyright’s regime for sampling can backfire. When
the derivative work is not created, the copyright holder in the preexist-
ing work receives no licensing revenue. This endangers the preexisting
work’s creator’s ability to solve his or her incentive problem.
A positive de minimis threshold gives copyright law a mechanism
to put some derivative works outside the reach of copyright, alleviat-
ing the incentive problem for some creators of derivative works and
potentially providing some balance. While not perfect, sample length
is an attractive policy lever because it is objective, not requiring pri-
vate parties or judges to engage in aesthetic assessments to understand
the reach of copyright law. But the de minimis threshold may entice
some samplers to alter the samples they use from their desired lengths.
That consequence has both advantages and drawbacks, in terms of the
number of works created and the value of the works created. With
a relatively small de minimis threshold, however, both these effects
will be relatively small. Based on the simple model presented so far,
it seems possible that some positive de minimis threshold would have
broad social benefits.
5 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the problems facing creators of derivative
works in the music industry, particularly those musicians engaged in
sampling or collage. Specifying a model of the division of profit be-
tween the copyright holders of preexisting works and the creator of a
prospective derivative work, I have attempted to isolate what I see as
the fundamental inefficiency involved. Because of factors the separa-
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tion in time between the original work and the derivative work, I have
argued that society has reason to be concerned about both samplees’
and samplers’ incentives at the same time, for the sake of both groups.
Although the model of Sections 3 focuses on the difficulties that can
arise in sample licensing because of non-contractibility, in truth the
situation is both better and worse than that for musicians who sam-
ple. On the plus side, musicians can adjust the samples they use, how
may samples they use, or even alter their method of musical borrowing
from sampling to “replaying” small pieces of compositions themselves
(which reduces the licensing burden to one type of license). Musi-
cians can also adjust the method by which they release their music to
the public; in essence, they have choice over their particular business
model. The tradeoffs involved can result in differently situated mu-
sicians making different business-model choices.35 Consideration of
copyright law’s policy toward sampling should take into account the
flexibility that samplers have on the margins of both artistic choices
and business models.
Extending the model to the multiple-sample situation shows that
the real-world situation of musicians who sample can be worse than the
stylized model suggests. Moreover, market imperfections like trans-
action costs, uncertainty, and asymmetric information would exacer-
bate the division-of-profit problem. For example, adding transaction
costs to the copyright-in-samples regime would create a deadweight
loss that would lead the copyright regime to fare worse (under any
assumptions) than the no-copyright-in-samples regime. The appro-
priate policy solution to the inefficiencies involved in sample licensing
requires a detailed investigation of the institutional features of the
music industry, a much longer project that I have participated in sep-
arately.36 This chapter seeks to lay a foundation for that work by
35A numerical simulation with calibrated assumptions about various music-industry
parameters can illustrate how different business models become more and less attractive
under which conditions. See Peter DiCola, “An Economic Model of Sampling, Cover
Versions, and Musical Collage,” (working paper on file with author, 2006).
36See Kembrew McLeod & Peter DiCola, Creative License: The Law and
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demonstrating that one cannot determine the optimal policy with a
simplistic appeal to property rights, as the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals took in Bridgeport. The division-of-profit problem, applied to
the context of sample licensing, shows that the interaction between
upstream and downstream authors is complex enough to resist such a
priori generalizations.
A Appendix: A three-person licens-
ing game
Three people bargain to divide a pie of size q. Player 1 is the licensee,
while Players 2 and 3 are the licensors. Their positions are asymmet-
ric. Player 1 deals with each other player in bilateral negotiations.
Players 2 and 3 act simultaneously during each round and cannot
communicate to strategize or collude. But all parties have complete
information about the structure of the game and the potential payoffs.
Negotiations continue indefinitely. The discount factor is the same
for all players and is δ ∈ (0, 1]. Deals are binding once made but no
bankruptcy allowed. So if the pie is not produced, no money is owed.
The breakdown payoff for each player is zero.
When a deal is accepted early, the player gets paid in terms of that
periods dollars, with no further discounting, even if the game carries
on and the pie is not produced until a later period.37 If one bilateral
deal is made between two players (say, Player 1 and Player 2) but
the other bilateral deal (between Player 1 and Player 3) is not, then
the remaining two players engage in the alternating-offers game of







between the first offeror
and the first offeree.
Game play proceeds as follows:
Culture of Digital Sampling (Duke Univ. Press, forthcoming 2010).
37See Suchan Chae & Jeong-Ae Yang, An N-Person Pure Bargaining Game, 62 J. Econ.
Theory 86, 89 (1994).
38See Rubinstein, supra.
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1. In round one, Player 1 simultaneously solicits offers from Players
2 and 3, resulting in the following payoffs for (Player 1, Player 2,
Player 3): (q − a1 − b1, a1, b1). Players 2 and 3 each make their
offers. There are four possible scenarios, based on the offers
made in the first round of bargaining.
(a) If Player 1 accepts both offers, then the game ends, with
payoffs equal to: (q − a1 − b1, a1, b1).
(b) If Player 1 accepts 2s price but rejects 3s, then we have a
bilateral game between 1 and 3, in which 1 makes the first









(c) If Player 1 rejects 2s price but accepts 3s, then we have a
bilateral game between 1 and 2, in which 1 makes the first








(d) If 1 rejects both 2 and 3 price quotes, then we reach round
two.
2. In round two, a similar 3-person game to round one is played for
a pie size δq and with the difference that player 1 make the first
offers. In the event that the game reaches round two, there are
four scenarios:
(a) Both Players 2 and 3 can accept, ending the game with
payoffs: (δ(q − a2 − b2), δa2, δb2).
(b) Player 2 could accept while player 3 rejects. This launches
a bilateral game between Player 1 and Player 3, with Player









(c) Player 2 could reject while player 3 accepts. This launches
a bilateral game between Player 1 and Player 2, with Player









(d) Both Players 2 and 3 could reject. Now we play the orig-
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inal three-person game, with Players 2 and 3 offering first,
for a pie of size δ2q. The structure is thus recursive. Call
the payoffs in the subgame (δ2(q − a− b), δ2a, δ2b), with no
subscripts on the offers.
To solve this infinitely repeated game, I follow the solution method
outlined in Gibbons.39 Taking the second round of bargaining first,
what would it take for both Player 2 and Player 3 to accept Player
1s offers? In other words, what are the incentive constraints for a
subgame-perfect equilibrium?
The first four conditions determine the optimal offers by Player
1 in round two of bargaining, a∗2 and b
∗
2, as a function of the con-
tinuation payoffs a and b in the event of the entire supergame being
repeated (i.e., when both Player 2 and Player 3 reject Player 1’s offers
in the second round). These conditions can be understood as Player
1 avoiding creating a prisoners’ dilemma among Player 2 and Player
3. The final three conditions consider what would it take, in the first
round of bargaining, for Player 1 to accept both Player 2’s and Player
3s offers.
1. Player 2’s payoff δa2 must be greater than or equal to δ2a, the
continuation payoff if neither Player 2 nor Player 3 accepts.
2. Player 3’s payoff δb2 must be greater than or equal to δ2b, the
continuation payoff if neither Player 2 nor Player 3 accepts.
3. Player 2’s payoff δa2 must also be greater than or equal to
δ2q−δb2
1+δ , which is Player 2’s payoff if Player 3 accepts while Player
2 rejects.
4. Player 3’s payoff δb2 must also be greater than or equal to δ
2q−δa2
1+δ ,
which is Player 3’s payoff if Player 2 accepts while Player 3 re-
jects.
39Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists 68-71 (1992) (citing
Rubinstein, supra, and Avner Shaked & John Sutton, Involuntary Unemployment as a
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 52 Econometrica 1351 (1984)).
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5. It must be the case that q− a1− b1 ≥ δ(q− a∗2− b∗2), so that it is
worthwhile from Player 1’s perspective not to reject both offers.
6. It must also be the case that q− a1 − b1 ≥ δq−a11+δ , so that Player
1 does not have incentive to accept Player 2’s offer but reject
Player 3’s offer.
7. Finally, and similarly, it must be true that q−a1−b1 ≥ δq−b11+δ , so
that Player 1 does not have incentive to accept Player 3’s offer
but reject Player 2’s offer.
This determines the optimal offers by Player 2 and Player 3 in
round one, as a function of the second-round continuation payoffs a
and b. In other words, to calculate the equilbrium, we will aim to set
a∗1(a) = a and b
∗
1(b) = b. Conditions (3) and (4) imply (1) and (2), but
not the reverse. So one must solve (3) and (4), the binding incentive
constraints, for Player 1s optimal second-round offers. Then, based
on that, we can get Player 1s best second-round payoff. Next, one can
solve equation (5) based on that result. It turns out that condition (5)
implies conditions (6) and (7), and the game is solved. The equilibrium
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as δ approaches 1.
33
